ASUCD 2020-2021 Reimagining Public Safety Task Force: Final Report

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Abstract

An urgent need exists to reimagine the system of public safety on college campuses. National incidents such as the 2020 murder of George Floyd and local occurences such as the 2011 Davis pepper spray incident are symptoms of deep-rooted, systematic racism and violence that have been pervasive in society and the police system for generations. In this report, the ASUCD Reimagining Public Safety Task Force, a completely student-led team under the ASUCD Executive Office, seeks to bring the student voice to the forefront of conversations around reimagining campus safety. The Task Force was informed by a literature review of 15+ academic articles, a small number of student listening sessions led by the Task Force itself, and additional research into the student opinion of campus safety at Davis. Based on its findings, the Task Force recommends a number of updates to campus safety programs, grouped into 6 key policy areas: 1) increasing the transparency of the UC Davis Police Department (UCDPD); 2) building a crisis intervention program to serve as an alternative to police responses in instances of nonviolent crisis; 3) reducing armaments while increasing transparency of armaments; 4) formal disaffiliation with the 1033 Program; 5) financial penalties to reduce certain categories of officer misconduct; and 6) additional and continuous student outreach.

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I. Introduction

History of Policing at UC Davis

The murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and countless other individuals have forced the US into a national reevaluation of its policing systems. Racism and violence have been prevalent in the American policing system since its creation (Blain 2020). Activists have been calling for change for decades. Countless universities and other institutions have recently stepped forward to claim their willingness to reimagine public safety, but in order for such actions to have meaning, institutions must first acknowledge their own internal histories of over-policing.

The 2011 pepper spray incident remains the most infamous example of over-policing at UC Davis, in which a police officer released pepper spray upon peaceful student protestors (Fallows 2011). In response to the pepper spray incident, UC Davis made changes to its public safety system, including creating a police oversight board known as the Police Accountability Board ("UC Davis Police Accountability Board" n.d.). But UC Davis's history of over-policing extends beyond this day.

Throughout America, individuals who are racially and ethnically marginalized, religiously targetted, undocumented, disabled, queer, and members of other marginalized groups often experience overpolicing. Specifically at UC Davis, many students from these backgrounds report concerns with campus police. For example, racially and ethnically marginalized students such as Black students, Latinx Students, and Palestinian students have reported and continue to report feelings of overpolicing and distrust in campus safety. Additionally, religiously targetted student communities such as the Muslim and Sikh communities frequently report similar concerns. Further, even if a student has never had a standout bad "incident" with campus police, many report feeling regularly scared, excluded, and marginalized by the presence of campus police officers due to the history of policing in America. (See: II. Methodologies: "Listening Sessions" for how we came to understand the student perspective.) Students report that incidents involving the City of Davis Police, such as the Picnic Day 5 incident, as well as incidents involving police at other UC campuses, such as sexual assault allegations toward the UCSB police chief, spill over in perpetuating feelings of unsafety on the UC Davis campus (Miller 2020, Staff 2020).

On May 23, 2019, ASUCD passed SR-16, and called upon UCDPD to disarm its campus police officers (Habchi 2019). ASUCD subsequently attempted to create the Police Relations Committee, which was later dissolved. Past ASUCD Executive Offices have also worked directly with UCDPD to recommend policy updates.

Students on campus outside of ASUCD have also engaged in advocacy to reimagine campus safety. Some groups call for abolishing campus police, while others call for disarmament and other reforms. While many of these advocacy groups are well-known across campus, some members report feelings of censorship of their advocacy at the institutional level. Faculty have

also engaged in conversation surrounding reimagining campus safety, perhaps most notably through a recent petition calling for the abolition of UCDPD (Adejunmobi 2020).

History of ASUCD Reimagining Public Safety Task Force

In January 2021, ASUCD President Kyle Krueger and ASUCD Chief of Staff Allie O'Brien hired three undergraduates to serve with them on the ASUCD Reimagining Public Safety Task Force. These students included Megan Chung, Rashita Chauhan, and Thomas Phillips. The ASUCD Reimagining Public Safety Task Force (often referred to as "the Task Force" throughout this report) was formed in order to better understand and relay the student perspective on campus safety. The Next Generation Reforms Task Force held town halls for undergraduate students to share their perspectives. However, the ASUCD Reimagining Public Safety Task Force recognized that the students who are the most impacted by policing may be the least comfortable with coming to such town halls. Furthermore, though making up a disproportionate amount of the campus community, students are frequently underrepresented in conversations on public safety. The ASUCD Reimagining Public Safety Task Force sought to increase representation of the student perspective in an objective, research-based manner, and to make policy recommendations based on this student perspective.

Together, the members of the Task Force spent four months conducting literature reviews and listening sessions in order to better understand the student perspective on policing. The ASUCD Task Force presented twice to the Next Generation Reforms Task Force, which incorporated some of this Task Force's recommendations into its own report. The ASUCD Task Force presents its own report to the Chancellor in order to fully convey its understanding of the student voice on campus safety. These recommendations are specific to public safety on Davis's main campus.

II. Methodologies

Literature Reviews

Academic Articles: To gather information about national and international trends in public safety, the Task Force obtained 15+ academic articles, many of which are listed in the bibliography. These included scientific studies, legal theses, and literature reviews. The scientific studies and literature reviews were assessed for their methods, findings, and policy implications in addition to relevant background information they described. Relevant sources and theoretical analyses were drawn from legal theses.

Journalistic Articles: The Task Force used journalistic articles to obtain information about distinct policy reforms that different nations, cities, and universities are adopting across the world. Of the articles used, most came from local news sources, including university newspapers, as well as reputable American media companies. These articles were reviewed to provide insight into feasible policy updates, and also provided a gateway to academic articles.

Reports: To gauge the effectiveness and determine the best model of implementation in regards to a crisis response team, the Task Force utilized city reports evaluating their pilot crisis response programs.

Listening Sessions

The second method of data collection the Task Force employed consisted of student listening sessions. Information was shared with the Task Force in full confidentiality, and all identifying information has been separated from the student sources.

The Task Force held both formal and informal listening sessions. Formal listening sessions were conducted with an outline of topics prepared by the Task Force, which allowed students to give both specific feedback on the Task Force's policy proposals, and broad feedback on systems of policing and campus safety generally. Informal listening sessions generally covered the same topics, but they were unstructured conversations, typically led by the students sharing their perspectives.

Outside of these listening sessions, the Task Force analyzed student input at the UCOP Campus Safety Symposium, looked through social media posts, followed the work of student organizations advocating for reimagining public safety, and reviewed past ASUCD resolutions and Aggie articles to understand the student opinion on campus safety. This Task Force believes that it is necessary to meet students where they are -- many students are already speaking loudly and publicly about policing; listening sessions are not the only way to receive valid input.

The Task Force's listening session sample size was under 10 students, though many of those the Task Force heard from recounted not only personal experiences and opinions, but also those of their friends, or other students with whom they had previously discussed policing or campus safety. Thus, the scope of the Task Force's listening sessions was much broader than 10 students. The large majority of students that the Task Force spoke with were from historically marginalized communities that have histories of over-policing. Due to the Task Force's small primary sample size and the need to protect the identities of listening session participants, the Task Force will not release more specific demographic information.

The Task Force publicized itself as a listening session host primarily via social media and email, performing outreach through student organizations and other networks. Despite its efforts, the Task Force met many barriers in performing outreach that are worth noting and taking into consideration in future outreach processes.

The first barrier the Task Force faced was the COVID-19 pandemic. The UC Davis student population has faced extreme "Zoom fatigue" and increased stress levels, decreasing many students' willingness to participate in conversations of this nature. Consequently, outreach was more difficult than expected in a virtual format.

Next, due to the small size of the Task Force, the Task Force did not have as many personal connections to students and student groups on campus as is ideal for an outreach-based task force. The Task Force discusses the ways in which personal relationships can be used to better understand the student opinion on campus policing in Policy Section 6, Future Outreach.

Lastly, long-standing frustration with policing task forces (Gardner 2021), ASUCD, and administration hindered the Task Force's ability to receive input from students. The Task Force acknowledges that historically, both ASUCD and campus administration have failed to listen to and act on the concerns of marginalized students on campus, including concerns about campus police. This severed trust is an understandable consequence of historic institutional failures, and is something the Task Force keenly acknowledges and respects.

III. Cautions Around Commonly Accepted Solutions

In the past few decades, policymakers in the United States have proposed many measures to improve the public safety system. However, many of these reforms are too general and insubstantial for improvements to occur. This Task Force does not recommend dismantling programs that already promote these commonly accepted solutions, but it advocates against over-reliance on them to produce systemic change.

De-escalation Training: The concept of "de-escalation training" received an endorsement from President Obama's task force on 21st Century Policing in 2015, resulting in the concept's widespread acceptance by experts and the public as a viable means to reform public safety (Engel et al. 2020). However, no common definition exists for "de-escalation training," and it remains a highly interpretable concept fraught with issues across disciplines. In a review of 64 publications pertaining to de-escalation training in the fields of public health, sociology, education, psychology, and criminal justice, it was revealed that although half of the studies (52%) reported decreases in violent incidents after the implementation of "de-escalation training" programs, the other half (48%) showed either no decrease in violence or an increase in violence. Furthermore, some studies showed initial decreases in violence after training, but gradual increases over the long term (Engel et al. 2020). Again, the Task Force does not recommend cancellation of any current de-escalation training programs, but rather advocates against viewing them as sufficient reforms.

Cultural Humility Training: It is the belief of this Task Force that efforts to improve public safety should not overly rely upon cultural humility training to solve police misconduct. While it is important to ensure that police departments and similar agencies are diverse and culturally sensitive, the vagueness behind the term "cultural humility training" leaves it subject to interpretation, and these trainings are merely a scratch on the surface of substantially changing the ways the public safety system interacts with communities. In addition, according to a report on "Civil Rights and Policing Practices" by a Minnesota Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, cultural humility and implicit bias trainings make a positive impact in the short term, but the effects are short-lived (Korbel et al. 2018). Numerous other studies reflect this finding. It is possible that cultural humility trainings can be made more effective, but they should not be overly relied upon as a solution.

Listening Sessions: Another reform that becomes insubstantial with over-reliance is the use of listening sessions to gather information about citizen opinions and experiences. It is very

important to allow folks to voice their concerns about public safety, but marginalized individuals are often underrepresented in listening sessions due to discomfort interacting with the policing system and inadequate outreach to their communities. Furthermore, many students report feeling that the existence of listening sessions undermines the fact that they have already made their positions publicly clear through affiliations with campus advocacy groups. This Task Force recommends that listening sessions be complemented with other ways of gaining student feedback, such as listening to existing student organizations and advocacy groups' public statements and demonstrations on campus.

IV. Recommendations & Evidence

Policy Area 1: Transparency

The Task Force acknowledges that transparency has been at the forefront of discussions surrounding campus safety both at Davis and during the UCOP Campus Safety Symposia. During the symposia, panelists iterated the difficulty in navigating police data, urging UC police departments to make all data surrounding police encounters and community demographics easily accessible to the public. The Task Force stands with these sentiments and puts forth the following transparency recommendations.

Recommendation 1.1: Create a Centralized UCDPD Website

Just because data is public does not mean it is accessible. This Task Force proposes centralizing all relevant information regarding UCDPD on one easily navigable website home page. Currently, there is a significant amount of information on the UCDPD website, but much of it is hard to find. Resources are scattered across a plethora of separate webpages, and crucial information housed in the 700+ page policy manual is difficult to locate. The Task Force believes that the most crucial information, as determined by the community, should be linked directly from a central UCDPD webpage. Resources such as the Fremont Police Department's transparency portal serve as a model for what a successful UCDPD central webpage may look like ("Fremont" n.d.). The Task Force believes that in order to increase transparency and centralization of UCDPD data, UCDPD should make updates including but not limited to the following sub-recommendations:

Sub-Recommendation 1.1.1: Improve access to officer demographic information
UCDPD should include demographic data on all UCDPD officers. Listening session participants echoed the importance of this. This information is one of the many data points that must be easily accessible on the website home page.

Sub-Recommendation 1.1.2: Improve access to demographic information of civilian encounters

As was discussed in the UCOP Public Safety Symposia, UCDPD should improve the accessibility of demographic information about individuals stopped by the police, with comparisons to demographics of the campus and local community for accountability (Waters et al. 2021).

Sub-Recommendation 1.1.3: Improve access to armament protocol
During listening sessions, students conveyed that many community members avoid calling campus police for fear of an armed officer arriving at the scene. UCDPD should provide accessible information detailing when to expect officers to arrive armed versus unarmed via a link on a central website home page. Campus must ensure that students do not avoid calling for help for fear of an armed officer showing up unexpectedly. [See Policy Area 3: Disarmament for more information on officer arms].

Sub-Recommendation 1.1.4: Improve detail of public budget
The budget that UCDPD currently allows public access to is wildly insufficient. The budget for the main campus police department, which totaled almost 8 million dollars in Fiscal Year 2020-2021, is composed of only two line items, "Comp (Salary and Benefits)" and "Other Operating Expenses & Supplies" ("UC Davis" 2021). This is not sufficiently transparent.

UCDPD should greatly increase the specificity of public budget information, including breakdowns of individual salaries and equipment costs. Listening sessions suggest that students seeking budget information are most concerned with access to specific information such as spending on weapons of different types, and this should be honored. The New Orleans Police Department website serves as a model of such specificity ("Mayor" n.d.).

Sub-Recommendation 1.1.5: Improve detail and accessibility of officer training overviews
Basic information regarding officer trainings is vaguely discussed in the public UCDPD policy manual. However, this information should be more detailed, and should be more easily accessible. The task force recommends including a link to information about officer trainings directly on the UCDPD website home page.

Recommendation 1.2: Publicize existing UCDPD policy beyond website
As it stands, UC Davis students are largely unaware of UCDPD policy. If administration wants to receive quality feedback from students regarding reimagining campus public safety, and if students are to feel welcome and safe on campus, online information about UCDPD policy is insufficient.

Administration should consider additional ways of publicizing UCDPD policy, such as offering detailed presentations at orientation, pamphlets across campus, and/or campus-wide emails. The information conveyed through these avenues should be similar to the information outlined in Recommendation 1.1, including information such as demographics, officer trainings, presence of arms, and budget.

Policy Area 2: Crisis Intervention

As the conversation surrounding reimagining American public safety grows, Eugene Oregon's Crisis Assistance Helping Out On the Streets (CAHOOTS) program has caught national attention. The CAHOOTS model offers a paradigm shift for crisis intervention, emphasizing the role of unarmed health professionals as first responders in de-escalating nonviolent crises. Instead of relying on armed police response to mental health and other nonviolent crises identified by 911 dispatchers, Eugene sends one (1) paramedic and one (1) mental health professional to the scene. This model has been replicated outside of Eugene, most notably through the Denver Support Team Assistance Response (STAR) program, and has seen success.

Recommendation 2.1: Establish a CAHOOTS-style crisis intervention team at UC Davis.

The CAHOOTS and STAR crisis intervention models have proven successful by a multitude of metrics, and should thus be replicated at UC Davis. This model recognizes that mental health professionals and paramedics with thorough knowledge of local resources are better equipped to de-escalate certain crises than police officers. Crises frequently addressed via the CAHOOTS and STAR programs include situations concerning mental health crises or unhoused individuals. In its first term of operation, a full 41% of Denver STAR interventions included transportation of an individual in crisis to a local resource (Kotalik 2021), rather than routing an individual to an emergency room or to the criminal justice system, as are two common outcomes of a police response to crises.

It is very much worth noting that the need for police backup on CAHOOTS and STAR calls was minimal to nonexistent, with a .01% backup rate for CAHOOTS (Shapiro 2020, Beck et al. 2020), and zero instances of police backup for STAR (Christianson 2021). Combined with the already low rates at which police in Davis use force, the Task Force believes that if proper time is spent reworking dispatching protocol, implementing a CAHOOTS-style program at Davis would be very safe for first-responders.

Further, the CAHOOTS and STAR programs allowed a high number of calls to be diverted from the police departments. The STAR team allowed for the diversion of 750 calls in its first 6 months of operation (Kotalik 2021), and the CAHOOTS team covered 24,000 calls over the course of 2019 (Beck et al. 2020). These high call diversion rates resulted in reduced costs of delivering public safety services overall in both Eugene and Denver (Shapiro 2021, Christianson 2021). It is uncertain, but possible, that Davis would experience a similar reduced cost of service.

Sub-recommendation 2.1.1: Redetermine with a crisis team and the community when dispatchers should direct calls to the new CAHOOTS-style team. Then, retrain dispatchers to identify these circumstances.

The success of CAHOOTS-style programs relies on the proper modification of dispatching protocol. The Denver STAR program has successfully avoided any incidents requiring police backup by using the following guidelines for dispatchers (Christianson 2021):

- Denver STAR *is* dispatched if a call is for an intoxicated person, a suicidal series, a welfare check, an indecent exposure, trespassing, or a syringe disposal.
- Dever STAR *is not* dispatched if a call includes indication of weapons, threats, violence, injuries, or serious medical needs.

The Task Force believes that UC Davis must work with the community to outline a similar set of guidelines determining when it is proper to dispatch its crisis team as a first response. UC Davis may model its policy after those of CAHOOTS and Denver STAR, but it is important for UC Davis to review these guidelines in partnership with its community to ensure that its policies are a good fit for Davis. Once guidelines are determined, it is important to properly train dispatchers, and thoroughly publicize these decisions to the UC Davis community so that callers are aware of what type of service they will receive.

Sub-recommendation 2.1.2: In the short term, train existing UC Davis paramedics in mental health and crisis de-escalation to serve as first-responders.

While UC Davis is in the process of hiring a full-time mental health first responder team (see Recommendation 2.1.3), UC Davis should train existing campus paramedics in mental health intervention and crisis de-escalation to use as first-responders to CAHOOTS-type crises instead of police. During listening sessions, students indicated increased feelings of safety and trust in interacting with campus paramedics, in comparison to campus police. Even with identical mental health and de-escalation training, unarmed paramedics have a less threatening presence than police.

Sub-recommendation 2.1.3: In the long-term, hire a 24/7 mental health team, potentially in conjunction with the City of Davis or Yolo County.

UC Davis should seek to hire and train a 24/7 mental health and crisis intervention staff to serve as unarmed first-responders to CAHOOTS-type crises. For financial reasons, it may make sense to share crisis response staff with the city and/or county.

It is important to adapt a 24/7 on-call system rather than a daytime hours system, because a large number of mental health crises occur at night. For example, Denver STAR was

operational from 9am-6pm in its first six months, servicing a total of 748 calls. However, dispatchers recorded that if STAR had been operational at night, an additional 2,546 calls could have been routed to the first-responder team. STAR thus intends to expand its hours of operation as it grows (Christianson 2021), and Davis should as well.

Sub-recommendation 2.1.4: Ensure Davis CAHOOTS staff is diverse, and completes extensive diversity training.
This recommendation was emphasized by Denver STAR's first term report and this Task Force's student listening sessions. STAR's first term report noted that some Denver residents showed hesitancy to speak with STAR staffers due to cultural barriers (Christianson 2021). Students agree that lack of cultural humility training and/or lack of understanding of Davis's unique populations would make first-responders feel less approachable.

Policy Area 3: Disarmament

Police disarmament is a contentious topic in the United States. Although many nations have largely unarmed law enforcement departments, virtually every police department in the United States requires officers to carry a firearm (Hawkins et al. 1970)*. Due to the high risk associated with police firearms as well as the psychological damage which they inflict on civilians, this Task Force implores administrators and members of the public to remain open minded to police disarmament as a future public safety improvement.*

Recommendation 3.1: Increased disarmament of UCDPD
Several universities across the U.S. are adopting different policies of disarmament. In 2020, the University of Oregon police department committed to a 26% reduction in armed officers (Schill 2020) and the University of Washington police department committed to a 20% reduction in officers and a decrease in arms (Cauce & Richards 2020). On June 11, 2021, Portland State University announced plans to completely disarm their police officers on patrol by September 1, 2021 (Percy 2021), after backlash resulted from a police shooting on campus in 2018 (KGW Staff 2021). Each school acknowledged how the presence of armed officers on campuses make some members of their community feel oppressed and unsafe, making these commitments to promote a safer campus environment (Schill 2020, Cauce & Richards 2020, Percy 2021).

There are many international examples of police disarmament as well; mass armament of police forces is not an international standard. In the United Kingdom, a survey indicated that 82% of the Police Federation did not desire carrying arms (Kelly 2012).

According to Use of Force data published by UCDPD, no lethal weapon was drawn by a campus police officer between 2018-2020 (Sheffield 2021, Beermann 2021). There were a total of eleven uses of force during this time period, two of which occurred on the main Davis campus. Both of these instances were uses of physical techniques (Sheffield 2021, Beermann

2021). Arms have not been used by a UCDPD officer on main campus in the past two years (Sheffield 2021, Beermann 2021).

During Task Force listening sessions, students conveyed their discomfort with armed campus police, especially those officers on patrol, responding to mental health crises, or responding to non-violent crimes. Students cited how rarely they suspected officers need to use force on the Davis campus as a prime cause for their discomfort. Some students even indicated that they refrain from calling for help when they need it for fear of an armed police officer arriving at the scene.

It is especially important for UCDPD to reconsider the usefulness of lethal arms, including for low-level violent crimes. During listening sessions, most students indicated greater comfort with officers carrying tasers rather than lethal arms to respond to low-level violent crimes. The Task Force supports efforts to scale down arms, given that arms are not necessary in the vast majority of situations that the UCDPD must address, and given that officers carrying arms inflicts psychological damage on students.

Students also reported feeling more favorable toward police officers carrying arms when responding to instances of sexual assault or sex trafficking, and potential school shooter scenarios. More research needs to be conducted in this area [See Section V Area 1].

Policy Area 4: 1033 Program

The 1033 Program is a federal program in which the U.S. Department of Defense distributes surplus military grade equipment to various police departments upon their request. The Task Force acknowledges that the UC Davis Police Department has not requested or retained any equipment through this program in recent years. However, the Task Force maintains that the existence of the 1033 Program provides a possible mechanism for militarization by future administrations of UCDPD, which may be inherently threatening towards students. Therefore, the Task Force urges the UC Davis administration to adopt the following recommendations.

Recommendation 4.1: Adopt a formal contract severing ties between UCDPD and the 1033 Program.

Through its surplus military equipment (SME) transfers, the 1033 Program is a large contributor to the militarization of local and state police departments. In various studies, no evidence has indicated that militarization, and thus the 1033 Program, reduces crime (Gunderson et al. 2019), and rather, law enforcement agencies having access to military equipment actually leads to higher levels of aggregate law enforcement violence (Delehanty et al. 2017). In addition, weapons and equipment acquired through the 1033 Program have been used to disproportionately target minority communities (Davenport et al. 2018). Therefore, given that the program both fails to reduce crime and negatively impacts minority communities, the Task Force urges UCDPD to sign a formal contract severing ties with the 1033 Program.

Recommendation 4.2: Reevaluate affiliation with the 1033 Program at a school-wide level.

While supplies from the 1033 Program are not utilized within UCDPD, the Task Force understands that other departments on campus have received and utilize equipment from the program. Though the equipment being accepted is non-weaponry, students reported in listening sessions that sheer affiliation with the program appears to reaffirm its use and continuation. Given the disproportionate impacts of the 1033 Program on communities of color (Davenport et al. 2018), the Task Force believes that UC Davis administration should attempt to distance itself from the program in its entirety. [See also Section V: Area of Further Research].

Policy Area 5: Financial penalties and liability insurance

In July 2020, New York state senators proposed a bill requiring all police officers to "obtain liability insurance and maintain coverage during the course of their employment as a police officer" (S8676 2020). This legislation, inspired by the work of academics like Noel Otu and Deborah Ramirez, has the potential to reduce police misconduct by imposing financial penalties for officers who violate the civil rights of citizens. As UCDPD does not carry a liability insurance plan or economically penalize police officers who engage in misconduct, this Task Force recommends that the UC Davis administration adopt a system similar to that proposed by the New York state legislators.

It is crucial to note that the Task Force believes insurance is not a sufficient solution to police misconduct. If a system as significant as public safety relies on financial penalties to minimize poor officer behavior, that system is fundamentally flawed and must be changed in the long-term. Insurance is a targeted solution to eliminate potential "bad cops" from the current policing team, but the elimination of a few "bad cops" is not a comprehensive solution to police violence. Much deeper structural changes must be made so that financial liability is not necessary to protect community members from harm.

Recommendation 5.1: Impose financial penalties for misconduct

Proponents of police liability insurance insist that it offers a long-term solution to police misconduct. They argue that by requiring individual law enforcement officers to carry coverage plans with premiums that increase after very minor policy infringements, lawmakers can create economic incentives for police to refrain from wrongful acts (Otu et al. 2004, Ramirez et al. 2019). Furthermore, they cite the surplus of data showing how automobile insurance premiums improve citizen driving as evidence that police liability insurance will be effective, as policing and driving require similar split-second, high-risk decision making. In addition to discouraging officers from engaging in poor behavior, this system would force violent or incompetent officers to leave their department before major incidents of misconduct occur, as high premiums would decrease their ability to make a living in the field of policing.

This Task Force acknowledges that every campus within the University of California currently self-insures their police department, meaning that there is no option for a commercial

insurance firm to hold police officers accountable for their actions. However, the defining feature of the system proposed by this Task Force is the presence of premiums that rise with misconduct, not the existence of a private insurer per se. It seems possible for the school administration to conceive a system similar to that proposed in New York, whereby individual officers are required to pay out of their own pocket for liability coverage and must pay higher sums of money if they engage in minor acts of misconduct--note that officers should be immediately removed for any instances of major of misconduct or criminality.

Recommendation 5.2: Consider purchasing a private liability insurance plan

Many police agencies across the country carry private liability insurance plans which cover the cost of payoffs in instances of misconduct. Legal academics, such as John Rappaport of the University of Chicago Law School, argue that these private insurance plans help combat police misconduct by introducing a third party, i.e. the insurer, that invests resources into measures which improve officer behavior (Rappaport 2016, Rappaport et al. 2019). In police departments with private liability coverage, the insurers often spend money on efforts such as police education and violence reduction training, as they do not want to suffer the financial burden of a liability payoff. By purchasing liability coverage for the campus police department, the UC Davis administration might decrease the likelihood that officers will engage in misconduct. However, the Task Force acknowledges that such a decision would likely involve a UC-wide shift that is beyond the power of UC Davis' chancellor, so the Task Force does not heavily emphasize the recommendation for purchasing private liability coverage.

Policy Area 6: Future Outreach

It is of utmost importance that the efforts made by UC Davis administration to update and improve campus safety continue. It is insufficient to solely work on issues of campus safety when policing is at the forefront of national attention; rather, this must be a perpetual effort on campus. As administration continues to improve campus safety, an important area of prioritization should be gaining more student input. There has been a severe lack of student input in processes to update campus safety policy to date, and this must be addressed in future years. It is necessary to prioritize student input in all campus safety policy making decisions. This Task Force has laid out a set of requirements that it believes are necessary to ensure that student voices are at the center of this work in the future.

Recommendation 6.1: Understand, Acknowledge, and Respect Abolition

In order for administration to gain the trust of students and properly understand student input on public safety, it is necessary for administration to understand, acknowledge, and respect the abolitionist movement that is growing amongst students. Though this report will generally discuss the abolitionist framework, the Task Force always recommends referring directly to the work of the abolitionist student groups on campus to best understand their specific organizational goals.

Abolition is not an immature framework, nor is it uninformed. The words "abolition" and "defund" are defined slightly differently by different individuals, but they both encompass broader paradigms that view social programs as a more useful solution to crime than punishment. The abolitionist perspective holds that crime can be minimized by meeting holistic community basic needs, and abolitionists often view the current criminal justice system as so inherently flawed that it is necessary to rebuild a completely new safety system from the ground up to put a stop to current injustices (Illing 2020).

The abolitionist movement is not specific to campus police. When UC Davis students say "abolish the police," they are typically speaking to American policing broadly, not only UC Davis Police. The vision is generally not to abolish campus police, and replace these officers with City of Davis police instead. The vision is to rework the entire system of public safety in America such that marginalized communities do not have to fear officers that are meant to protect them, and such that individuals do not need to turn to crime to meet their basic needs. Abolitionists range in their preferred timeline for these changes, with some individuals preferring immediate dissolution of policing systems, while others advocate for "incremental abolition" over time (Waters et al. 2021). It is important to note that the strain of abolition which advocates for the immediate dissolution of police departments does not expect crime to immediately disappear, rather, it holds that communities can respond to most crime in ways that are more restorative than sending individuals through the current justice system.

As abolition increases in popularity amongst students, its significance cannot be ignored, downplayed, or overwritten by administration or ASUCD. Listening to the student perspective on campus safety requires listening to and understanding abolitionist movements on campus.

Recommendation 6.2: Recognize student frustration with task forces.

Many students refuse to speak to campus task forces regarding policing on campus, including the ASUCD Task Force. This is for two primary reasons: 1) task forces have been historically ineffective at remedying issues with campus safety, and 2) some feel that reform-based task forces legitimize a broken system of policing, and should not exist at all (Gardner 2021).

This resistance to speaking with task forces and people with institutional power is the price UC Davis and ASUCD are paying for having broken trust with many in the UC Davis community. Students have been speaking out about the need to reimagine campus safety for a long time, and are angered by the slow rate of progress compared to their policy requests. Students have reported feeling that their time and emotional labor are tokenized in discussions with UC Davis administration, ASUCD, and at the UCOP Public Safety Symposium. Many students are frustrated when task forces are created instead of implementing immediate policy changes.

It is crucial to distinguish that a student's refusal to speak with a task force is not an invitation to ignore that student's perspective. Many students who refuse to speak to task forces do so because they have already made their opinions loud and clear, but have felt unheard by

administration and ASUCD. It is important to research, understand, and listen to the student voices that already exist, whether via student organizations, on- or off-campus advocacy groups, social media posts, demonstrations and protests, or other avenues, before expecting students to take extra time to speak with ASUCD and administration directly.

Recommendation 6.3: Recognize and Minimize Power Imbalances

It is crucial to understand that the communities of students most affected by policing are those who are often most hesitant, uncomfortable, and even fearful to discuss policing with administration. This includes but is not limited to Black students, Palestinian students, Muslim students, Indigenous students, queer students, disabled students, and undocumented students. It is unacceptable to move forward without the input of these student communities most affected by policing. All input opportunities must thus be built with these communities in mind. Based on the Task Force's own experiences, when feedback opportunities are thrown together quickly, they often inadvertently exclude the most marginalized community members. But when feedback opportunities are fine-tuned to accommodate our most marginalized communities, they generally become accessible to all.

Sub-Recommendation 6.3.1: Feedback opportunities should always include options for anonymity.
Consider whether any identifying information is attached to feedback, and whether collection of identifying information (or lack thereof) is being properly conveyed to student participants. If identifying information is attached to any feedback, consider where that feedback is being sent. Students affected by policing are uncomfortable with their feedback going straight to UCDPD. Students may have differing levels of comfort with feedback going to administrators, vs. faculty members, vs. the Police Accountability Board (PAB), vs. student analysis teams. Consider creative options, including but not limited to those listed above, to keep students' information safe.

Sub-Recommendation 6.3.2: Always perform outreach to students; never expect students to reach out to administration.
Many students who have been historically marginalized, and even many students who have not, have lost trust in campus administration's ability to appropriately handle feedback concerning public safety. Thus, folks who hold institutional power should not expect students to come forward unprompted with feedback regarding public safety. Administration must work to rebuild trust by performing continuous outreach first.

Sub-Recommendation 6.3.3: When reaching out for feedback, consider using campus representatives with the closest relationships to students, without being deceptive.

It may be the case that students are much more comfortable talking to certain campus representatives than others about public safety. For example, campus counsellors, social workers, and advisors often have closer relationships with larger numbers of students than do administrators. These campus representatives may be a more comfortable first line of contact for students who would like to give their feedback regarding campus safety.

With that being said, transparency is crucial, and students should be well informed of where their feedback will be sent. If information is passed up to high-level administrators from these closer representatives without explicit and continuous student consent, community trust will be broken.

Recommendation 6.4: Make all feedback opportunities quick and simple by default, with options for lengthy input.

It is important that giving input is easy for students, but it is also important that students feel they are able to fully express their viewpoints at length if they so prefer. For instance, if a new policy has been proposed that administration is looking to receive student input on, administration should consider including a one-question survey in a campus-wide email. This survey could include a text box for optional elaboration, and an email to set up a listening session if students would like to speak directly with administration regarding the policy.

Recommendation 6.5: Address the knowledge gap between administration and students.

As discussed in Policy Area 1: Transparency, many students are largely unaware of UCDPD's current demographics, budget, workload, and policy. This must be remedied in order to receive meaningful feedback from students in the future. [See relevant recommendations in Policy Area 1].

V. Areas of Further Research

In addition to the recommendations that this Task Force officially proposes, certain areas require further research and future action.

Area 1: Disarmament

In Recommendation 3.1 of this report, the Task Force urges increased disarmament of campus PD, and details the student input we have received on the appropriateness (or lack thereof) of armaments in a variety of circumstances on campus. While the Task Force acknowledges the desire for specific disarmament percentages in these recommendations, there is a lack of data on current UCDPD armament percentages that would be required to make these recommendations [See Policy Area 1: Transparency].

The Task Force believes that UCDPD should publicize current police armament data and reevaluate the necessity of armaments in non-violent and mental-health related circumstances.

UCDPD should publicize a specific numerical disarmament percentage that the public can hold the department accountable for meeting and maintaining. Further research should explore the usefulness of different types of arms in situations such as, but not limited to, sexual assault, trafficking, shootings, and other violent crimes. This research should be done with extreme care, as sexual assault and other violent crime survivors are often retraumatized by discussing their experiences.

Area 2: 1033 Program

In Recommendation 4.2, the Task Force urges a school-wide disaffiliation from the 1033 Program. Given that the focus of this Task Force was on the UC Davis Police Department, the Task Force was unable to determine the exact scope of 1033 equipment usage throughout the University. However, the Task Force urges each university department that currently utilizes equipment from the 1033 Program to reevaluate their ability to acquire this equipment elsewhere. In addition, for the sake of transparency, the Task Force recommends that the university publicize the equipment that has been acquired. [See Recommendation 4.2 for an elaboration of the Task Force's reasoning].

Area 3: Plain clothed/casually clothed officers

Recently, UCDPD has moved towards casual attire for officers on patrol. This raises concerns for some students on campus, as was made clear in the Task Force listening sessions. Student concern arises around a potential repeat of the "Picnic Day 5" incident in which the interference of plainclothes officers in an altercation led to confusion, and brought about public outcry. One student was particularly scared by the idea of seeing an armed person on campus and being unable to quickly identify them as a police officer rather than a school shooting threat. This student emphasized that though they are generally uncomfortable in the presence of police, they would rather know when police are on site than have to worry about being around an officer that they are unaware of.

This Task Force only spoke with one student regarding casually-dressed police officers, but the Task Force understands that similar data was collected by other campus bodies. Appropriate attire for officers on campus should be the topic of future student feedback opportunities to determine how to best protect students' feelings of comfort and safety.

Area 4: Post-Interaction Surveys

One change that this Task Force understands that UCDPD may be working towards is the implementation of post-interaction surveys after police encounters. Based on feedback from Task Force listening sessions, there are multiple details regarding post-interaction surveys that the Task Force requests UCDPD consider.

First, if this update is pursued, UCDPD must use great attention to detail in formatting a post-interaction survey system that ensures maximum comfort to individuals filing negative reports. UCDPD should consider the ease with which surveys are submitted, and whether any

barriers may be discouraging submissions, such as requiring an individual to access the internet, enter a police facility, or interact with police officers. Ideally, there should be flexibility in submissions, but administration, in collaboration with students and community members, should further research how students and community members would feel most comfortable completing this process if it is to be pursued.

Second, it is necessary to consider who will review post-interaction surveys. Students are often most uncomfortable with information entering the hands of the UCDPD. Considering alternative review methods, such as the PAB or other independent bodies, is recommended.

Third, UCDPD must consider the confidentiality of survey respondents. Even if all demographic information is separated from surveys, due to the low crime rate in Davis, specific survey responses might be easily recognizable. Considering this, UCDPD and administration must determine how to best separate identities from surveys, and be very transparent with the community if this separation is not entirely possible.

It is important to note that none of these considerations will affect the rate of survey responses if they are not publicized to the community. If post-interaction surveys are pursued, administration and UCDPD must work together to ensure that the community is aware of all of the benefits and risks of filling out post-interaction surveys.

It is crucial to understand that even if all of these cautions are considered, many students and community members may never feel fully safe filing a negative post-interaction survey for an officer. It is dangerous for the department to assume that all positive post-interaction survey responses are genuine. The Task Force's listening sessions suggested that students may feel intimidated by post-interaction surveys, and offer positive responses as a way to avoid punishment. The Task Force's listening sessions suggested that if UCDPD were to use post-interaction surveys as a measure of police performance, students would question their integrity and the integrity of the department.

Thus, rather than using post-interaction surveys as a holistic measure of police performance, this Task Force preliminarily recommends using post-interaction surveys solely to catch complaints.

VI. Conclusion

The ASUCD Reimagining Public Safety Task Force spent the last four months working to understand the student perspective on policing, and present recommendations based on such a perspective. Through conducting numerous literature reviews and a handful of student listening sessions, the ASUCD Task Force has created this report. The ASUCD Task Force has outlined six (6) areas of policy recommendations regarding campus safety on the UC Davis campus in its report. However, the ASUCD Task Force recognizes the inadequacy of its research in fully representing the student perspective, in part due to a historical distrust of task force effectiveness. The ASUCD Task Force ultimately outlines its recommendations as a beginning, not an end. It

sees its recommendations as the first steps in an ongoing conversation to improve public safety for UC Davis students, and to better represent students in conversations on public safety.

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